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Abstract 
Climate change poses the ultimate dichotomy between social welfare and individual 
incentives because, despite the global benefits synonymous with mitigation, 
individuals lack incentive to reduce their own emissions. Using a public good 
experiment with a climate change framing, this paper examines the scope for 
cooperation in meeting a national mitigation goal; in particular, the experimental 
design examines how different sectors with differing marginal abatement costs 
distribute the responsibility of reducing emissions between themselves. The 
experiment consists of four treatments including the counterfactual baseline scenario 
which examines voluntary cooperation, a communication treatment examining the 
role of stakeholder participation in facilitating cooperation and, finally, two 
treatments simulating a carbon tax, where the carbon tax reflects an electricity levy. 
The results suggest that voluntary cooperation will not be sufficient to meet the 
mitigation target. While communication significantly increases average contribution 
levels, it also polarises individual player strategies between full cooperation and free 
riding. With the introduction of a tax, cooperation becomes near-universal. However, 
a carbon tax crowds out contributions in excess of a specified mitigation target. This 
emphasises the important of choosing the correct tax level. 
 









Given mitigation as a public good, climate change poses the ultimate social dilemma: 
curtailing greenhouse gas emissions entails a private cost while the benefits are shared 
equally by all – creating an incentive for individuals to free-ride, ultimately emitting more 
greenhouse gases than is optimal (Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008).  
 
While the dominant strategy in linear public good games is for each player to contribute 
nothing, subjects make positive but suboptimal contributions to public good provision 
(Cherry and Kroll 2005). Similarly, in the application to mitigation, despite no individual 
incentive to do so, governments, businesses and individuals are taking steps to reduce 
emissions. As Irwin (2009) notes, this attempt at reducing emissions does not imply that 
emission levels will be reduced to optimal levels, but suggests that potential for cooperation 
exists. Using a public good framework with a climate change framing, this paper explores 
the potential for cooperation in the context of this social dilemma.  
 
A variant of the standard Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) is used to examine the 
cooperative behaviour of different player-types in meeting a national emission reduction 
target when players can invest in mitigation or continue with business-as-usual. The two 
player-types, who represent different sectors of society, have differing marginal costs of 
abatement. The experiment consists of four treatments: the standard VCM, a VCM with 
communication opportunities and two VCM variants which specify minimum contributions 
to the public good. The experiment is carried out with university students in South Africa. 
The South African context is of particular interest given that the country is the largest 
emitter in Africa and is committed to reducing emissions by 34% below business as usual by 





The significant reduction in greenhouse gases needed to avoid catastrophic climate change 
requires a great degree of cooperation among asymmetric agents. The Kyoto Protocol 
requires countries with large income and historical emission disparities to reach consensus 
on individual targets for the reduction of emissions. On a national scale, reducing a national 
greenhouse inventory requires a change of behaviour from industry and individuals who are 
asymmetric with regards to income, energy consumption, abatement costs and historical 
emissions. Whereas the experimental evidence from public good games with homogenous 
groups reflect the norm of equal contributions (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004, Reuben and 
Riedl 2009, Gächter and Herrmann 2009), it is not immediately evident what contribution 
norm will arise in a public good context with heterogeneous groups. Experimental evidence 
of the effect of asymmetry on cooperation is mixed.
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 Some authors report that heterogeneity 
improves group contribution levels (Chan et al. 1999, Chan et al. 1996), while others find 
the opposite effect (Anderson et al. 2004, Rappoport and Suleiman 1993, Cherry et al. 2005, 
Isaac and Walker 1988).Fisher et al. (1995), who examine the impact of asymmetric MPCRs 
in a linear public good setting, find that low-MPCR players contribute less to public good 
provision relative to high-MPCR players. In terms of the impact of endowment 
heterogeneity on individual contributions, Buckley and Croson (2006) report that low 
income players contribute a higher proportion of income to the public account relative to 
high income players and Hofmeyr et al. (2007) conclude that wealthy players contribute the 
same percent of income to the public account as their wealthier counterparts. The impact of 
heterogeneity on cooperation is particularly significant in the context of mitigation given 
that suboptimal levels of cooperation will not subvert the potentially catastrophic effects of 
climate change.  
 
                                                          
1
 Asymmetry has been introduced into the public good framework by varying subjects‟ participation 
fees (Anderson et al. 2004), endowments (Rappoport and Suleiman 1993, Bagnoli and McKee 1991, 
Cherry et al. 2005, Chan et al. 1996, Buckley and Croson 2006, Hofmeyr et al. 2007, Isaac and 
Walker 1988, Chan et al. 1999), marginal per capital returns (MPCRs) (Fisher et al. 1995, Tan 2008) 
and private account valuations (Palfrey and Prisbrey 1997). 
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The experimental results suggest that voluntary contributions are insufficient to meet a 
mitigation goal. Specifically, in the baseline treatment, the most dominant contribution 
norm, irrespective of player-type, was to free ride. With the introduction of communication, 
average contribution increased: the number of groups meeting the mitigation target increased 
from 35% to 50%.  However, communication increased the polarisation of player strategies 
between free riding and full cooperation. Despite this fact, the frequency of full 
cooperation increased significantly with the introduction of communication – 
suggesting that communication helps “high cooperators” to coordinate strategies 
(Gächter and Herrmann 2009). The results suggest that stakeholder participation 
plays an important role in a national climate dialogue. Taxation resulted in near 
universal compliance with the target. Importantly, taxation may crowd out 
contributions in excess of the target. This makes choosing the right tax level critical 
for the environmental result.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the policy setting and problems which 
underpin the experiment design. Section 3  describes the experimental framing, design and 
parameters. The experimental results are examined in Section 4. Section 5 draws policy 
implications.  
2 Policy setting 
A public good experiment is used to examine the cooperative behaviour of different player-
types in reducing a national greenhouse gas inventory – when players can invest in either 
mitigation or continue with business-as-usual.  
 
The experimental design analyses a particular dimension of the carbon pricing question, 
namely, how players with differing marginal costs of abatement distribute the responsibility 
of reducing emissions between themselves. While the scenario is applicable to any context 
in which marginal abatement costs differ, the framing specifically refers to “capital” and 
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“labour”.  Players were explicitly told to think of capital as representing firms and labour as 
representing households.  
 
In line with the climate change framing, players are told that government has specified a 
national emission reduction target; only in some instances is the target binding. The 
experiment includes four treatments. To construct a proper counterfactual, the status quo 
treatment examines the potential for voluntary cooperation in meeting a mitigation target. 
This treatment is extended in the following round by allowing players to communicate with 
one another. The communication treatment is assessing the importance of stakeholder 
participation in promoting cooperation (by facilitating buy-in and creating a shared sensed of 
responsibility). The final two treatments simulate a carbon tax. Treasury unequivocally 
favours a carbon tax, noting in the 2010 Budget Review that the electricity levy introduced 
in 2008 is the first step towards a carbon tax in South Africa (National Treasury, 2010). 
Given that the electricity sector accounts for nearly 50% of South Africa‟s emissions 
(Winkler and Marquard 2009) and the fact that South Africa is contending with critically 
low reserve margins, the design of the carbon tax reflects both demand side management 
(DSM) and emission mitigation objectives in the electricity sector. As such, the carbon tax 
schemes are designed to simulate electricity levies and, specifically, a uniform and a 
differential tax on peak electricity consumption. These differential tax schemes emphasize 
the equity and distributive fairness considerations that have become important subtexts in 
global and national climate change negotiations. We assume it is cheaper for firms to reduce 
a given unit of peak electricity consumption, relative to households, given greater mitigation 





3 Experiment  
Upon entering the lab, participants were told to think of themselves as representing either 
capital (firms) or labour (households). The game was played in groups of four consisting of 
two capital and two labour players. 
 
In the standard VCM (baseline treatment), participants are endowed with 10 tokens, and 
must decide how to allocate the tokens between a private and public account, where the 
public account signifies investments in mitigation.  
 
Subjects‟ payoffs are given by Equations 1 and 2, where 
iK
c  and 
iL
c  signify investments in 
the public good by capital and labour, respectively.  
 
The private account represents investment opportunities other than investing in mitigation. 
Because capital can more easily invest in productive (income-generating) activities as 
compared to labour, capital earns a higher return from money invested in the private 
account. Equations 1 and 2 indicate that each token contributed to the private account 



























ccc                                                               (2) 
 
It is assumed that marginal contributions to the public account are asymmetric. Households 
have limited avenues with which to achieve significant reductions in electricity 
consumption; specifically, households can purchase solar water heaters, geyser blankets, 
replace incandescent light bulbs with more efficient Compact Fluorescent Light bulbs 
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(CFLs), and reduce heating requirements by improving insulation. While expensive for the 
average household, many of these measures are prohibitively expensive for low-income 
households. Conversely, in addition to the above measures, the commercial sector can take 
advantage of “low hanging fruit” (decommission lifts and revolving doors, use timers to 
switch off lights in buildings and parking lots etc.).  It is therefore assumed that capital has a 
lower marginal cost of abatement relative to labour, and is able to reduce more emissions 
with one token. In other words, each token invested by capital in mitigation makes a larger 
marginal contribution to the public good relative to a token invested by labour. Capital and 
labour‟s contributions to the public account are therefore multiplied by 20 and 10, 
respectively, reflecting the idea that  capital is able to contribute more to emissions 
reductions relative to labour, at the same personal cost. This is illustrated in Table 1, which 
tabulates emissions reductions, per token invested in the public account, for both player 
types. Note that the  sum of contributions to the public account denotes the units of 
emissions reduced by the group. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The tokens invested in mitigation are distributed equally amongst the four group members: 
no one is excluded from the benefits of mitigation. Thus, each member of the group receives 
the same income from the public account – irrespective of his or her contribution level. As 
such, one token invested in the public account by capital generates a return for each group 
member of 5 tokens; similarly, one token invested in the public account by labour generates 
a return for each group member of 2.5 tokens. Notably, for both capital and labour, the 
marginal per capita return (MPCR), which is the ratio between the marginal value of a token 
invested in mitigation and the marginal value of a token invested in the private account, is 
0.42. Thus the MPCR from investing in mitigation is the same for all players, again 




As the setting of the national target forms part of a multilateral commitment to reduce 
emissions, the return from mitigation quantifies the benefit of a decrease in the risks related 
to climate change, such as environmental disaster.
2
 In addition, with a focus on DSM in the 
electricity sector, the returns from mitigation include a reduction in the probability of black-
outs amid reduced peak consumption.   
Given that the return to mitigation for each player is less than the return from the private 
account, the dominant strategy for both capital and labour is to invest nothing in mitigation 
whereas the social optimum is achieved when all players contribute their full endowment to 
mitigation. 
 
Subjects were told that government has set a national emission reduction target in line with 
its multilateral obligations. An explicit reduction target of 240 units was specified. Table 1 
illustrates that the target can be met via capital and labour contributing different 
combinations of tokens to the public good. In this first treatment, the target was not binding 
but government‟s commitment in meeting the target was emphasised.  
 
This VCM is extended by way of three experimental variants which are outlined below: 
 
Variant 1.    Introduce the possibility of communication with group members.  
 
The communication treatment is identical to the baseline treatment except that subjects were 
able to communicate with their group members via an online chat program in order to 
decide, as a group, how best to meet the target. Players were informed that the group 
decision was not binding and that they were still free to decide on their own contribution. In 
their review of the experimental evidence, Gächter and Herrmann (2009) argue that 
communication facilitates and sustains cooperation. They note that communication helps 
                                                          
2
 We add the caveat that the benefits of avoided climate impacts would only be realised in the event 
that other countries similarly cooperated. 
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cooperators to coordinate strategies, adds a dimension of social pressure and introduces 
feelings of guilt when mutual promises are broken. In an application to climate policy, Irwin 
(2009)  discusses the use of communication as an avenue to promote a cooperative norm 
through moralizing, while Gowdy (2007) argues that creating a shared responsibility and 
appealing to a sense of common good is an effective way to garner support for 
environmental policies. 
 
Variant 2. Specify minimum contributions to the public good and sanction free-riding; 
equal emission reductions. 
 
All sectors in the economy reduce emissions equally, irrespective of the difference in the 
cost of abatement. To meet the target of reducing emissions by 240 units and reduce 
emissions by the same quantity, all four players must reduce emissions by 60 units each. 
This is equivalent to each capital player contributing 3 tokens to the public account and each 
labour player contributing 6 tokens (Table 1) (this treatment is referred to as Tax36). Each 
player is fined ten tokens for every token below the specified minimum contribution.  
A policy parallel is a uniform tax on peak consumption. In addition to having a lower 
marginal cost of abatement, firms would be better able, relative to households who have 
fixed energy requirements – for example cooking dinner and washing clothing after work at 
peak times, to take advantage of off-peak rates.  
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c                    (6) 
The Nash Equilibrium is moved inwards to (3,6) for (capital, labour), respectively.  
 
Variant 3.  Specify minimum contributions to the public good and sanction free-riding; the 
cost of reducing emissions is split equally between player-types. 
 
Capital and Labour can reduce emissions by different quantities as long as they are 
contributing the same amount in tokens. If each capital and labour player contributes 4 
tokens, each group will collectively meet the emission reduction target (see Table 1) (this 
treatment is referred to as Tax44). In this case, capital players must reduce emissions by 80 
units each, while labour players must reduce emissions by 40 units each. Each player is fined 
ten tokens for every token below the specified minimum contribution. The analogous policy 
example in this case would be differential rates on peak consumption (progressive tax). 
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The Nash Equilibrium is moved inwards to (4,4) for (capital, labour), respectively.  
 
3.1 Procedures 
The experiment was conducted with 204 students recruited from the University of Cape 
Town (UCT) in the Western Cape of South Africa. Students from a broad spectrum of 
faculties were targeted for participation including commerce, humanities and the built 
environment.  
 
The experiment consisted of three different sequences. Sequence 1 merely consisted of four 
repetitions of the baseline treatment and acts as a control: Seq 1 (B1, B2, B3, B4). Sequence 2 
and 3 consisted of the baseline, communication and tax treatments, and differed only in the 
ordering of the treatments: Seq 2 (B1, Comm., Tax36, Tax44); Seq 3 (B1, Tax44, Comm., 
Tax36). All experimental sessions commenced with Baseline1 as it was important that 
subjects understand the experiment framing. Each sequence was completed over 2 sittings 
and consisted of a sample of 68 subjects.  
 
The experiments were performed manually. Upon entering the laboratory, each participant 
randomly drew an experiment number and factor of production. Unless told otherwise, 
communication was prohibited with anyone except the experimenter. Subjects were aware 
that each group consisted of two capital and two labour players, but were not aware of the 
identities of their group members. Information relating to their group members' individual 
contributions was also not made available. Participants were assigned to new groups at the 
start of each treatment. 
 
The instructions were read aloud by the experimenter while the subjects followed on their 
own hard copies. Payoffs were common knowledge. While the experiment had a climate 
12 
 
change framing, the instructions were neutrally-worded in relation to issues around social 
justice. In addition, language referring to capital and labour remained neutral: subjects were 
simply told to think of capital as representing firms and labour as representing households.  
 
Apart from the instructions, students were provided with summary sheets and payoff tables 
to assist them in making their decisions. Before commencing with the experiment, examples 
were conducted with the participants. In addition, an excel-spreadsheet calculator was 
provided to students for use during the experiment.   
 
Mann-Whitney tests can‟t reject the null hypothesis that the contributions in the two sittings 
of each sequence  are drawn from the same distribution ( 110.0p  for all sequences) (See 
Appendix A). As such, when discussing the experimental results for each treatment, mean 
contributions are averaged across the two sittings in which each sequence was conducted. In 
addition, like-treatments in Sequence 2 and 3 will be pooled given that Mann-Whitney tests 
do not find them to be significantly different (Appendix A).  
4 Experimental results 
This section provides an analysis of the experimental results. The main policy conclusions 
are drawn in the discussion in Section 5.  
Average earnings for participating in the experiment (including the R20 show-up fee) were 
approximately R132. Capital players fared better at R152 while Labour players averaged 
R111.  
4.1 Contribution levels and norms 
Table 2 reflects the average contributions of players across the various treatments. 
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4.1.1 Baseline (Sequence 1) 
 
As reflected in Table 2, average contribution levels (across player-types) range between 2.2 
– 2.9 for the 4 treatments in Sequence 1 (Baseline). These contribution rates undershoot 
those typically seen in the literature, where, in one shot public good games, contributions to 
the public good generally range between 40-60% of endowments (Ledyard 1995). 
Contribution levels are more in line with those seen in repeated play, where contributions 
decay over time (Hermann et al. 2008) but remain between 15-25% of individual 
endowments in the final round (Isaac and Walker 1988). While the Spearman rank-order 
correlation between mean contributions and treatments is negative but insignificant 
)100.0,0073.0(  p  over all four treatments, the decreasing pattern for the first three 
treatments is significant at the 10% level )084.0,121.0(  p . 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Observation 1. Player heterogeneity has no significant impact on cooperation 
 
Figure 1 plots the average contributions of both player-types in each of the 4 treatments in 
Sequence 1 (Baseline). Mann-Whitney tests confirm there to be no significant difference 
between capital and labour contributions in each treatment (p>0.080 for all four treatments). 
Appendix B illustrates the distribution of capital and labour contributions, by treatment. 
Over the 4 treatments, capital contributes zero tokens 37% of the time as compared to 40% 
for labour. The most apparent contribution norm, irrespective of player-type, is to contribute 
zero tokens (free-ride).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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4.1.2 Communication (Sequence 2 and 3) 
Observation 2. Communication significantly increases cooperation  
 
Average contributions across player-types increased from 3.2 in the baseline treatment to 4.4 
with communication (Table 2). Capital increased contributions on average by 1.4 tokens; 
this is comparably similar to that of labour where contributions increased by an average 1.1 
tokens. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests confirm that communication significantly increases 
average contributions (average: 001.0p ; capital: 018.0p ; labour: 034.0p ). A 
Mann-Whitney test indicates there to be no significant difference between capital and labour 
average contributions ( 001.0p ) in the presence of communication.  
 
An examination of individual (as opposed to mean) contribution rates confirms that 
communication significantly increases cooperation. Table 3 reflects the frequency of 
contributions at each possible contribution level for the Baseline and Communication 
treatments, by player-type. It is evident that communication increases the frequency of plays 
of ten tokens (full-cooperation) and zero tokens (free-riding). A plot of the frequency 
distributions in Appendix C confirms that communication polarises contribution levels at 0 
and 10 tokens. 
For capital, a comparison of the frequency of plays of 10 tokens between the Baseline and 
Communication treatments is significant at the 1% level
3
 confirming that communication 
encourages cooperative behaviour. Conversely, a comparison of the frequency of plays of 
zero tokens between the two treatments is insignificant )419.0,654.0(
2
]1[
 p . 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
                                                          
3
 Fisher exact test: frequency of plays of ten tokens in the baseline treatment < 5. 
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For labour, a comparison of the frequency of plays of 10 tokens between the Baseline and 
Communication treatments is highly significant )01.0( p 4, while a comparison of the 




 p . Once again, communication encourages cooperative behaviour. 
 
Observation 3. Labour free-rides significantly more than capital  
 
Do contributions of zero and ten tokens differ by player-type? The frequency of plays of 
zero tokens in the baseline treatment is 21% for capital as compared to 34% for labour. This 
difference is only significant at the 10% level )083.0,007.3(
2
]1[
 p . In the 
communication treatment, capital contributes zero 27% of the time versus 46% for labour. 




 p . 
 
This result suggests that subjects with a higher marginal cost of abatement/lower marginal 
contribution to the public good under-contribute to the public good relative to their 
counterparts with a lower marginal cost, unless they are forced to contribute through a tax 
regime.  
4.1.3 Taxation 
The emission reduction target of 240 can be met through capital and labour players 
contributing different combinations of tokens towards public good provision (Table 1). In 
the context of a homogonous group-setting, where equal contributions to the public good 
would imply equal emissions reductions and earnings, a reasonable contribution norm would 
dictate that all players contribute the same amount in tokens (Ruben and Riedl 2009), 
                                                          
4
 Fisher exact test: frequency of plays of ten tokens in the baseline treatment < 5. 
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however, in the context of heterogeneous groups such as ours, it is not clear what allocation 
principle should apply.  
 
Observation 4. Taxation reduces the frequency of contributions below the specified 
contribution rate 
 
In the baseline treatment, the Nash equilibrium was (0, 0) for both capital and labour 
players. In the case of the Tax36 and Tax44 treatment, the Nash is moved inwards to (3, 6) 
and (4,4) for capital and labour, respectively.
5
 As evident from Table 2, average 
contributions for both players approximate (or exceed) the Nash, as expected.
6
 In the Tax36 
treatment, 65% of capital players contribute 3 tokens while 74% of labour players contribute 
6 tokens. Similarly, in the Tax44 treatment, 56% of capital and labour players contribute 4 
tokens. Chi-square tests confirm that in the tax treatments, as compared to the baseline and 
communication treatments, the frequency of contributions below the specified minimum 
contributions is reduced.  This suggests that taxation discourages contributions below the 
minimum contribution. These results serve to confirm that subjects fully understood the 
payoffs associated with the experiment. 
   
Observation 5. Taxation crowds-out
7
 contributions in excess of the Nash equilibrium for 
capital players 
                                                          
5
 The Nash equilibrium become (3,6) and (4,4) in the Tax36 and Tax44 treatments, respectively, as 
capital and labour can never do better than contributing their corresponding amounts since 
contributing less when faced with a tax will result in losses.  
6
 Contributions increase significantly in the Tax36 treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:       ) 
and Tax44 treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:       ) relative to the baseline. 
 
7
 A pre-requisite for complete crowding-out is that the pre and post-taxation Nash equilibrium is an 
interior solution (Andreoni, 1993). As we are testing for the frequency of free-riding, in our design, 
the Nash equilibrium before taxation is for each subject to contribute zero to the public good. Thus, 
we simply comment on the degree to which rising taxes partially crowd out voluntary contributions.     
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While the presence of taxation certainly reduces free-riding, it is necessary to examine 
whether the introduction of a tax reduces the likelihood of subjects contributing in excess of 
the minimum contribution.  
Capital contributed 4 or more tokens 31% of the time in the Tax36 treatment as compared to 
44% in the baseline treatment )05.0,128.5(
2
]1[




 p (Table 3); the fact that these differences are highly 
significant indicates that the presence of the tax discourages cooperative behaviour beyond 
the specified target. Capital plays 5 or more tokens 31% of the time in the Tax44 treatment 




 p ; the introduction of the tax discouraged cooperative behaviour 
relative to the communication treatment.  
In the Tax36 treatment, labour contributes 7 or more tokens 25% of the time, as compared to 
10% for the baseline treatment and 37% for the communication treatment. Comparison of 




 p , while comparison with communication is only significant at the 
15% level.  Relative to the baseline treatment, the presence of a tax encourages cooperative 
behaviour. Finally, labour contributes 5 or more tokens 44% of the time in the Tax44 
treatment, versus 31% in the baseline case and 44% in the presence of communication. A 





The effect of the tax thus differs according to player-type. Taxation discourages 
contributions in excess of the Nash equilibrium for capital as compared to the baseline and 
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communication scenarios. Conversely, in the case of labour, taxation encourages cooperative 
behaviour beyond the Nash equilibrium. 
The impact of the different tax schedules on contributions is tested more formally by 
performing a pooled OLS regression using the pooled data from the baseline and tax 
treatments in Sequence 2 and 3. The regression is run separately for capital and labour. 
Following Benzing and Andrews (2004) the model is specified as: 
  2211 DDH  
where H  signifies the contribution in excess of the specified tax rate.  
Note: this analysis differs slightly from above as the baseline treatment is treated as an 
example of a tax of zero. Thus, the constant term, , signifies (voluntary) average 
contributions amid a tax of zero (any contribution greater or equal to one is voluntary). For 
capital, 11 D if the tax is 4 and 0 otherwise (Tax44), while 12 D if the tax is 3 and 0 
otherwise (Tax36 treatment). For labour, 11 D  if the tax is 4 and 0 otherwise (Tax44), 
while 12 D if the tax is 6 and 0 otherwise (Tax36). The results from the regression are 
replicated in Table 4. The expected values of H  for the different tax specifications are 
reported in Table 5. The results indicate that the voluntary contribution levels decline as the 
burden of the tax rises, suggesting there is incomplete crowding out (Andreoni, 1993).  
4.2 Public good provision 
Observation 6. Communication and taxation increase compliance with the target  
 
Table 6 reflects the percentage of groups that met the target across the various treatments. In 
sequence 1, on average across the 4 treatments, 18% of groups met the target. With respect 
to the pooled data (Sequence 2 and 3), 35% of groups in the baseline treatment met the 
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target. With the introduction of communication, 50% of groups met the target. Compliance 
with the target increases markedly with the introduction of taxation. 
5 Discussion 
The baseline treatment examines voluntary cooperation in the context of meeting a 
mitigation goal. The baseline treatments in Sequence 1 suggest that cooperation decays over 
time. Furthermore, it was found that the most apparent contribution norm, irrespective of 
player-type, is to contribute zero tokens (free-ride). The predilection towards free-riding is 
explained by the high opportunity cost associated with investing in mitigation. For capital, 1 
token invested in the private account returns 12 tokens, outpacing the public account return 
of 5. Likewise, for labour, the private account return of 5 exceeds the return of 2.5 from 
investing in the environment. As such, the individual return to mitigation, for both player-
types, is less than the return earned on alternate investment opportunities.  
 
 
The communication treatment is identical to the baseline treatment except that subjects were 
able to communicate with their group members via an online chat program in order to 
decide, as a group, how best to meet the target; however, the group decision was not 
binding. Average contributions increased with communication. Furthermore, the frequency 
of individual plays of ten tokens in the communication treatment relative to the baseline 
treatment increased significantly – indicating that communication facilitated cooperation by 
helping high cooperators to coordinate strategies (Gächter and Herrmann 2009). The results 
suggest that stakeholder participation plays an important role in a national climate dialogue. 
However, the experimental results suggest that communication polarises player strategies. 
Around 26% and 31% of capital players contributed either zero or ten tokens in the 
communication treatment, respectively.  In the case of labour, 46% contributed zero tokens 
while 25% contributed ten tokens. This result indicates that the introduction of punishment 
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for free-riders would facilitate further cooperation. The inclusion of a punishment round is a 
natural extension to this experimental framing. In the context of compliance with a national 
emissions reduction target, the results indicate that voluntary cooperation may not be 
sufficient to reach a national target. In the Baseline treatment, only 35% of groups met the 
target. With the introduction of communication, cooperation is significantly improved: 50% 
percent of groups reach the target. While an improvement, in the context of climate change, 
50% compliance would not be sufficient to subvert catastrophic climate change.  
 
Two carbon tax regimes were simulated, namely equal reduction in emissions (uniform tax 
on peak consumption) and equal cost of reducing emissions (differential rates on peak 
consumption). Taxation results in near universal compliance with the target. However, the 
results also indicate that a carbon tax may crowd out contributions in excess of a given 
mitigation goal. For capital, the tax decreases the frequency of contributions in excess of the 
tax relative to the communication treatment. This is also true of labour in the uniform tax 
scheme. This makes choosing the right tax level critical for the environmental result.  
 
It is also evident that taxation has an opposite effect on voluntary cooperation in the two 
groups “capital” and “labour”. For labour, taxation encourages contributions in excess of the 
tax relative to the baseline treatment. The analysis of the baseline and communication 
treatments (sequence 2 and 3) indicate that labour free-rides significantly more than capital – 
where capital and labour are two groups with different marginal abatement cost curves. This 
result might well be due to the equity subtext of the framing: mitigation by capital (who has 
a relatively lower marginal cost of abatement) is more efficient per token. By reducing 
inequity (particularly in the case of differential tax on peak consumption), taxation 






Table 1. Emissions reductions, per token invested in the public account 
 
Tokens Units emissions 
reduced 
 K L 
0 0 0 
1 20 10 
2 40 20 
3 60 30 
4 80 40 
5 100 50 
6 120 60 
7 140 70 
8 160 80 
9 180 90 
10 200 100 
 
Table 2. Average contributions 
Sequence 1 Sequence 2 and 3 
 Avg. K L  Avg. K. L 































































 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Capital (n=68)            
Baseline 0.206 0.103 0.059 0.191 0.162 0.074 0.059 0.029 0.059 0.000 0.059 
Communication 0.265 0.044 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.088 0.029 0.029 0.015 0.000 0.309 
Tax36 0.015 0.000 0.029 0.647 0.074 0.059 0.074 0.029 0.015 0.000 0.059 
Tax44 0.044 0.015 0.000 0.074 0.559 0.132 0.103 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.044 
Labour (n=68)            
Baseline 0.338 0.074 0.088 0.059 0.132 0.132 0.074 0.015 0.029 0.000 0.059 
Communication 0.456 0.029 0.029 0.000 0.044 0.029 0.044 0.029 0.044 0.044 0.250 
Tax36 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.735 0.074 0.059 0.015 0.103 
Tax44 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.559 0.250 0.044 0.044 0.015 0.015 0.074 





















Table 4. Estimates of crowding-out 
Dep var: H
= vol. contr 
Capital Labour 
 Value S.E. Value S.E. 
  3.426* 0.346 2.985* 0.360 
1  -2.735* 0.311 -1.941* 0.308 
2  -2.413* 0.294 -2.338* 0.321 
)67,2(F  40.40  26.51  
2R  0.248  0.191  
Observations 204  204  
Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for clustering;* significant at the 
1% level; inclusion of control variables such as treatment, 
sequence,session, age, gender and race are insignificant.  
 
 









Value = E(H) 
Exp. vol. 
contribution 
Tax 0   3.426 Tax 0   2.985 
Tax 3 
2   1.014 Tax 4 1   1.044 
Tax 4 
1   0.691 Tax 6 2   0.647 
      
 


















0.18 0.35 0.50 0.91 0.88 
Note: 
1
Average across the 4 treatments; 
2
Sequence 2 and 3 
  
                                                          
8
 Note that Benzing and Andrews (2004) attribute differences between the expected voluntary 
contribution and actual reported contributions (in our case the estimates reported in Table 4) to the 
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7 Appendix  
 
Appendix A  Mann-Whitney test  
Mann-Whitney test 
                                
 
 Sequence 1 Sequence 2 Sequence 3 
Treatment 1                         
Treatment 2                         
Treatment 3                         




                                  
 
Baseline          
Communication         
Tax36         








Appendix B  Frequency distributions, by player-type and treatment, Sequence 1 (Baseline)  
 

















Appendix C  Frequency distributions, by player-type and treatment, Sequence 2 and 3 
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